Background and History of Afghanistan:
United States Policy in Afghanistan (1989-2001)

The United States policy towards Afghanistan has taken several distinct phases in the last two decades. Throughout the 1980’s when Afghan Mujaheen fought the Soviet army, the United States government was heavily involved in Afghanistan affairs. The CIA, through the Pakistani ISI and military intelligence, funneled billions of dollars in economics and military aid to the Afghan Mujahedeen. Among the chief beneficiaries was the Hezb-e Islamic force, headed by Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and responsible for some of worst atrocities of the civil war. Despite the fact that the U.S. was clearly aware of extensive human rights violations by factions it aided, there is no evidence that any action was taken by the U.S. to prohibit Pakistan from distributing aid to the worst of the resistance forces or to criticize the Pakistani ISI for participating in abuses.

After the complete withdrawal of Soviet army from Afghan soil and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Empire, thus end of the Cold War, the United States policy towards Afghanistan faded away and Washington’s support for the insurgents ended. Suddenly, the entire international community walked away from Afghanistan and without a transitional government, Kabul fell on the hands of seven loosely united and heavily armed warring factions and their regional supporters. In an interview with CNN, Robert Gate, then CIA director said, “Afghanistan was a battle field between the United States and the Soviet Union, now that the battle is ended, we have other agendas and other countries in mind and Afghanistan is not one of them.” The United States ignored Afghanistan for a decade allowing its regional allies, namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to take advantage of the political vacuum created by the US retreat. Regional observers believe that the US strategic absence between 1992-1994 allowed the regional powers to support the competing warlords thereby intensifying the civil war.

Between 1994-1996, the U.S. supported the Taliban politically through its allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for two reasons. The group’s initial professed intention to clean up the drug trade was of interest, as was its anti-Iran stance. Perhaps most importantly, the Taliban appeared to be the faction most likely to provide security for an oil and gas pipeline project proposed by the U.S. Petroleum Company UNOCAL. UNOCAL officials applauded the fall of Kabul to the Taliban and expressed their eagerness to do business with the regime. Despite evidence of reported human rights abuses such as after the capture of Herat in 1995, Taliban authorities threw out thousands of girls and women from school and workforce. The United States not only remained silent, but also continued its support by allowing Pakistan and Saudi to back up Taliban in their conquest to capture Kabul.

In September of 1996, the fall of Kabul was welcomed and applauded by the US State Department and some members of the US Congress and Senate. Disregarding the severe oppression of women and the massive violations of human rights by the Taliban, the US officials were ready to talk with the group’s leaders and the plan to re-open the American Embassy in Kabul was on the way.

The U.S. position during the Taliban’s early years is also evident from the remarks of the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Ms. Robin Raphel. In a statement in November 1996 at a United Nations meeting she said, “Despite nearly universal misgivings about the Taliban, it must be acknowledged as a significant factor in the Afghan equation and one that will not simply disappear any time soon. The Taliban control more than two-thirds of the country; they are Afghan, they are indigenous, they have demonstrated staying power. The reasons they have succeeded so far have little to do with military prowess or outside military assistance. Indeed, when they have engaged in truly serious fighting, the Taliban have not fared so well. The real source of their success has been the willingness of many Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, to tacitly trade unending fighting and chaos for a measure of peace and security, even with severe social restrictions...It is not the interest of Afghanistan or any of us here that the Taliban be isolated.”

This notion that the Taliban offered peace and that the Afghan people welcomed them, notwithstanding its price, was a flawed analysis of Afghanistan under the Taliban. A 1998 health and human rights survey of women living under the Taliban indicated, this was not the perception shared by Afghan women themselves. Women were overwhelmingly horrified by the Taliban and its repressive rule, and many indicated that the period of civil war and rocketing was preferable to a life of begging, hunger, virtual house arrest, imprisonment, and enforced wearing of the burqa. Moreover, Raphel’s insistence that the Taliban were “indigenous,” and the implication that they achieved power because of popular support was proved null by the clear record of military, economic, and political support provided by Pakistan.

In late 1997, as the Taliban consolidated their control, their gross abuses, particularly against women, and failure to make good on promises to crack down on the drug trade, their glow appeared to fade in Washington. With Madeleine Albright’s appointment as Secretary of State in 1997, and the replacement of Raphel with Ambassador Karl (Rick) Inderfurth, U.S. position toward Taliban changed and criticism of the Taliban accelerated. Secretary Albright’s visit to an Afghan refugee camp in November 1997, and her strong speech condemning Taliban’s abuses of women and children, were a clear break with past American policy. The Secretary not only championed the rights of women and girls but went on to say “...we do not believe that the Taliban are in a position to occupy all of Afghanistan.”

The Taliban’s close association with the Saudi millionaire, Osama Bin Laden, whom American intelligence agencies saw as the mastermind behind the bombing of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of 1998, further soured Washington on the Taliban. Following the Embassy bombings, the US fired 70 cruise missiles to destroy all Bin Laden’s training camps in Southern Afghanistan. Subsequently, the CIA offered a $5million reward for Bin Laden’s capture and the Clinton administration banned all U.S. trade and investment in Afghanistan. From 1998 on, despite intense pressure from the United States government, the Taliban authorities repeatedly refused to hand over Bin Laden, or to expel him to a third country where he could be brought to justice. Taliban’s supreme leader declared that Bin Laden was a guest in Afghanistan and that the Taliban would never expel him. After 1998 bombing of the two US Embassies in Africa, the US twisted its position on Taliban-- denouncing them and their Pakistani supporters. Since 1998, US foreign policy on Afghanistan was revolved around a single issue: capturing Osama Bin Laden. In October of 1999, the UN Security Council adapted a US-sponsored resolution, imposing sanctions on the Taliban unless they turned Bin Laden over within 30 days. The Taliban made some attempts to avoid the sanctions, but they did not comply with the UN Security Council's demand. Despite US efforts, the Taliban did not only continue, but also deepened their relationship with Osama Bin Ladin and his terrorist networks.

Despite repeat cautions from regional experts-- unless Afghanistan moves towards peace, many more Bin Ladens would be trained there, destabilizing the region and jeopardizing the US national the security and security of the world as a whole-- the US chose to do little to restore peace and security in Afghanistan.

Then the September 11 terrorist attacks happened and resulted in a sudden shift of US policy towards Afghanistan and the Taliban. Notwithstanding Taliban’s lack of cooperation in the past, the US was negotiating with the radical group leaders, days before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Regional experts believe that the US had promised the Taliban a long term support and assistance in return for their cooperation.

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